Effects of a ban on multiple mandates on the competitive situation in the appointment of supervisory board members

Focus topic: Company valuation

Prof. Dr. Ewald Aschauer, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Alexander Hofer, LL.B. M. Sc., Vienna University of Economics and Business and Johannes Kepler University Linz, Dr. Felix P. Niggemann, University of Zurich and Prof. Dr. Dr. Georg Schneider, University of Graz

This article analyzes under which circumstances a prohibition of multiple mandates in the competition for the expertise of a supervisory board member can reduce remaining corporate liability risks. We show that multiple mandates can make economic sense, as the expertise of the supervisory board member is available to several companies. However, an efficient allocation of mandates is not always possible in a competitive environment. In certain cases, a ban on multiple mandates can prevent strategic distortions of competition and curb the excessive exercise of multiple mandates.

BFuP No. 4 dated 16.08.2024 page 490